INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION
Inspect the receipt.
Verify the evidence.
Check the hardware, application and signature behind a TokHive execution. Add the original request or response to check its contents, too.
Your evidence
01 — INPUTVerification report
02 — RESULTEvidence before confidence.
Your checks will appear here. A valid signature alone does not establish trusted hardware or the application that ran.
- Receipt signature
- AMD + AWS attestation
- Trusted application
- Request / response integrity
Declarations bound to the receipt
From hash-matching content. Model names and usage are declarations, not independent model identification or token recounting.
Signed execution details
These details are trusted only when the receipt passes all required checks.
What this result means
ONE CORE, TWO INTERFACES
The same checks in your terminal.
tokhive-verify verify \
--expected-app snp-app:<trusted-hash> \
--response response.raw receipt.cborAdd --job-spec and --request to check the input, or --json for a machine-readable report.
KNOW THE SCOPE
Integrity, with clear limits.
The receipt commits to the task specification and response bytes. Model and usage fields inside those bytes are indirectly bound when the supplied content matches.
Transformed API responses may differ from the upstream bytes the TEE signed. Historical evidence with expired certificates is refused. Request-ID lookup uses the public buyer evidence API; only your own requests are accessible.